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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
AND INSTITUTIONS: ACCOMPLISHMENTS
AND PROSPECTS
Thomas Buergenthal*
I. INTRODUCTION
Evaluating accomplishments and prospects in the area of interna-
tional human rights law recalls the oft-used rhetorical question about
whether the glass is half empty or half full. As far as human rights are
concerned, if the question is "how much has been achieved," the
answer must be "a great deal." If the question is "how much remains
to be achieved," the answer will be the same: "a great deal." Has a
great deal more been achieved than remains to be accomplished? Yes
and no; it all depends where we start and what we consider to be
achievements.
Tonight I propose to examine these questions and to introduce you
to international human rights law and the institutions that apply it.
This cannot, of course, be done in any great depth in a relatively short
lecture. Let me, therefore, apologize in advance for what must of
necessity be a superficial treatment of a topic that would require many
more hours to exhaust, by which time you and I would be sound
asleep.
To begin, it might be worthwhile to reflect upon the fact that proba-
bly at no other time in the history of mankind have more human
beings believed that they are entitled to the enjoyment of human rights
than today. The yearning for a society in which human rights are
respected has become a universal phenomenon of our times, which is
of great significance for the achievement of this goal.
Please do not misunderstand me, I am not suggesting that at other
times in history human beings did not wish to be treated with dignity
or have their rights protected. Of course they did. What I am sug-
gesting is that never before have as many people around the world
believed that they have human rights, that the rights are entitled to be
respected, and that it is the obligation of government to respect and to
protect them. In the past, the vast majority of humankind accepted its
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suffering as preordained or unavoidable. That is no longer true. Peo-
ple may suffer today as much or more than at other times in history,
and they may have to tolerate their suffering, but they view it as illegal
and unjust. On the whole, they consider governments that engage in
large-scale violations of human rights as lacking legitimacy for that
very reason.
How do we explain this phenomenon, and what consequences does
it have? One very important consequence, and I shall return to it, is
that today the struggle against governmental oppression and abuse has
gained international legitimacy. This legitimacy is in itself a major
factor in the struggle to improve the state of human rights in the
world. The struggle gained legitimacy, in part at least, because of the
very profound transformation that international law has undergone
since the end of World War II and the establishment of the United
Nations. Let me now trace that transformation.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
A. Birth of Fundamental Principles
The international law of human rights as we know it today is a post-
World War II phenomenon.' It is closely related to the monstrous
violations of human rights that were committed during the Hitler era.
Pre-World War II international law did not, with minor exceptions,
regulate the manner in which governments treated their own nation-
als. In those days, international law was not violated if a state denied
basic human rights to its own citizenry. Since such conduct was not
regulated by international law, it remained ipso facto a subject within
the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of each nation. This fact gave gov-
ernments a valid legal basis for claiming that any protest by another
government against their human rights violations was an unlawful
intervention in their domestic affairs. It also served as an excuse for
governments wishing to remain silent in the face of massive violations
of human rights by other governments.
The need for international legal norms and institutions addressing
human rights violations became apparent in the 1930's and 1940's.
As early as 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called, in his
famous "Four Freedoms" speech, for "a world founded upon four
essential human freedoms," namely, "freedom of speech and expres-
1. For an excellent overview of the entire subject, see Sohn. The New International Law:
Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States. 32 Amt. U.L. REV. 1 (1982). For
material on pre-World War II human rights practice, see L. SOHN & T. BULRGINTHAI.
[NTI-RNATIONA1 PROTFCTION oF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-373 (1973).
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sion," "freedom of every person to worship God in his own way,"
"freedom from want," and "freedom from fear."2 Roosevelt's vision
became the clarion call of the nations that fought the Axis in the Sec-
ond World War and that founded the United Nations.
The human rights principles which ultimately found their way into
the Charter of the United Nations fell far short of the expectations
aroused by Roosevelt's vision and wartime rhetoric. This should not
surprise anyone, for each of the principal powers victorious in World
War II had serious human rights problems on its hands. The Soviet
Union had its Gulag, the United States its de jure racial discrimina-
tion, France and Great Britain their colonial empires. It was obvi-
ously not in the interest of these nations to create the effective
international system for the protection of human rights that various
smaller nations advocated. Although the big powers succeeded in sig-
nificantly weakening the human rights provisions ultimately included
in the United Nations Charter, these provisions nevertheless laid the
legal foundation for the development of contemporary international
human rights law.
B. Human Rights Principles of the United Nations Charter
The United Nations Charter3 is both the constitution of the Organi-
zation and a legally binding multilateral treaty. Article 1, paragraph 3
of the Charter declares that one of the purposes of the United Nations
is "[t]o achieve international cooperation . . . in pzomoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 4 The
obligation of the Organization for achieving these purposes is set out
in Article 55:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.5
2. WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION, 3 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 26, 33
(1941).
3. Reprinted in R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 10.1 (1985).
4. Id. at 10.1-10.2.
5. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 10.4.
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In Article 56 the Member States "pledge themselves to take joint
and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."6
You will note that the "pledge" of the Member States under Article
56 is limited to promoting "the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55." The Member States did not, consequently, undertake
"to observe" or "to respect" the human rights identified in Article
55(c). They assumed instead the more ambiguous obligation to "pro-
mote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms.... "7 The Charter, however, does not specifi-
cally define or list the rights and freedoms that are to be promoted.
Although these Charter provisions created only weak and vague
obligations, they were very important from a legal point of view: they
transformed human rights, once only a matter of domestic concern,
into the subject of international treaty obligations. As such, human
rights could conceptually no longer be considered exclusively within
the domestic jurisdiction of the Member States of the United Nations.
C. The United Nations Charter as a Foundation for International
Human Rights Law
These modest beginnings ushered in a process that gradually inter-
nationalized human rights and humanized international law.' The
Charter spawned a vast body of international human rights law,
encompassing numerous international agreements and instruments,
adopted by the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and such
regional intergovernmental organizations as the Council of Europe,
the Organization of American States and the Organization of Africa
Unity.9 This law has not, of course, put an end to human rights viola-
tions. It has created an international climate, however, that is increas-
ingly sensitive to their illegality, less willing to tolerate them, and more
responsive to public and private efforts to prevent them. These new
attitudes are reflected in the establishment of intergovernmental and
nongovernmental international and regional institutions and organiza-
tions for the promotion and protection of human rights. The interna-
tional condemnations and pressure to which recalcitrant governments
6. Id. art. 56, reprinted in R. LILItCH, supra note 3. at 10.4.
7. Id. art. 55, para. c, reprinied in R. Lit. ICH, supra note 3, at 10.4.
8. See Buergenthal, A Challenge for the Universities, 31 UNESCO COURIER 25. 28 (1978).
9. For an overview, see HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAl LAw: Li GAl .XNi) POI ICN
issui:s (T. Meron ed. 1984) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS].
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are increasingly being subjected tend to have a prophylactic and ame-
liorative effect.
As governments come to realize that they must pay a higher polit-
ical price for violating their international human rights obligations, the
world's human rights situation cannot but improve. Do not for one
moment believe, however, that the struggle has been won. It has not;
we have a long way to go. Human rights are still being violated on a
massive scale in many parts of the world, and it will take many years
and much effort to put an end to these violations. The slow progress is
largely attributable to the fact that the vast majority of governments
prefer a world in which they do not have to account either to their
own people or to international institutions for their conduct. Because
there is still such a long way to go, it is useful to review where we are
today, more than forty years after the Charter of the United Nations
was adopted. What does international human rights law now consist
of and what institutions have been established?
III. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
When the United Nations Charter was being drafted in San Fran-
cisco in 1945, various smaller countries attempted to append a bill of
human rights. This effort failed, but its proponents extracted a prom-
ise that the drafting of such an instrument become the first order of
business of the United Nations. The promise was kept. But it was
soon recognized that there was no agreement on what should be
included in a bill of rights. More importantly, there was serious disa-
greement about the manner in which specific rights should be drafted,
what exceptions and limitations should be permitted, and what inter-
national institutions should be established to supervise governmental
compliance. When these disagreements threatened to bog down the
drafting process indefinitely, the Member States decided to proceed in
stages. The first stage was to consist of the adoption of a human rights
declaration drafted in general terms. This declaration was to be fol-
lowed by one or more human rights treaties, which would spell out
specific legal obligations and establish an international enforcement
system.
The first stage of this drafting process proved relatively easy; by
1948 the United Nations had proclaimed the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The second set of documents-the International Cov-
enants on Human Rights-took eighteen years to draft. They entered
Washington Law Review
into force ten years later in 1976.10
What took so long? The reluctance of governments to assume spe-
cific and binding international legal obligations requiring them not to
violate human rights. Why was it so easy to get the Universal Decla-
ration adopted? Because it was deemed to be nonbinding and because
it established no enforcement machinery. Why did the governments
comprising the United Nations bother to proclaim it? Because they
knew that people all over the world are "for" human rights, and a
little hypocrisy makes for good politics everywhere. By voting for the
Declaration, governments were able to claim that they were strong
supporters of human rights without, supposedly, assuming any risks or
legal obligations. What they did not reckon with is the force that ideas
have when their time has come. The story of the transformation of the
Universal Declaration proves that point.
A. The Universal Declaration
The United Nations Charter internationalized human rights; but the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights" has become the centerpiece
of the international human rights revolution.' 2 The Declaration is the
first comprehensive statement enumerating the basic rights of the indi-
vidual to be promulgated by a universal international organization.
As such, it ranks with the Magna Carta, the French Declaration of
the Rights of Man, and the American Declaration of Independence as
a milestone in mankind's struggle for freedom and human dignity. Its
debt to these great historic documents is unmistakable. "All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights," proclaims Arti-
cle 1 of the Universal Declaration,' 3 and Article 28 adds "[e]veryone is
entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized."' 4 The
legal and political importance that the Universal Declaration acquired
10. See generally Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 39 (1968) (18th Report of the Commission to
Study the Organization of Peace).
11. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL
DI CILARATION], reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 440.1.
12. Tomuschat, Human Rights in a World-Wide Framework: Some Current Issues, 45
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 547. 550 (1985):
Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its History. Inpact and Juridical
Character. in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21 (B.
Ramcharan ed. 1979).
13. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 11, art. 1, reprinted in R. LIIIICH. supra note 3.
at 440.1
14. Id. art. 28. reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 440.5.
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over the years remains unmatched by any other international human
rights instrument. The Declaration is an historical milestone in yet
another respect: it recognizes that individuals have not only civil and
political rights but also economic, social, and cultural rights and pro-
claims both of these categories of rights.
The Declaration's list of civil and political rights includes the right
to life, liberty, and security of person; the prohibition of slavery, tor-
ture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; the right not to be
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; the right to a fair trial
in both civil and criminal matters; the presumption of innocence and
the prohibition against the application of ex post facto laws and penal-
ties. The Declaration recognizes the right to privacy and the right to
own property. It proclaims freedom of speech, religion, and assembly.
The Declaration acknowledges the right to freedom of movement and
provides in Article 13 that everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country. Important political
rights are proclaimed in Article 21 of the Declaration, including the
right to take part in the government of one's country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.
The economic, social, and cultural rights proclaimed in the Declara-
tion have their starting point in the proposition, expressed in Article
22, that "[e]veryone, as a member of society ... is entitled to realiza-
tion, through national effort and international co-operation and in
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and
the free development of his personality."'" The Declaration accord-
ingly proclaims the individual's right to social security, to work, and
to "protection against unemployment."' 6 The right to education is
dealt with in Article 26 of the Declaration, which provides, among
other things, that education shall be free "at least in the elementary
and fundamental stages."' 7 It established a "prior right" of parents
"to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their chil-
dren.""8 Article 27 of the Declaration deals with cultural rights and
proclaims that every human being has "the right freely to participate
in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits.'19
15. Id. art. 22, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 440.4.
16. Id. art. 23, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 440.4.
17. Id. art. 26, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 440.4.
18. Id.
19. Id. art. 27, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 440.4.
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The Declaration recognizes that the rights it proclaims are not abso-
lute. It permits a state to enact laws limiting the exercise of these
rights solely for the purpose of securing "due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just require-
ments of morality, public order and the general welfare in a demo-
cratic society."2  A government's authority to impose such
restrictions is further limited by the stipulation that "[n]othing in this
Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein."
2
'
The Universal Declaration is not a treaty. It was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in the form of a resolution22 that
has no force of law, and it was not intended by the Assembly to create
binding legal obligations. Contrary to popular myth, it was not
signed, nor is it an instrument intended to be signed. The Declaration
was designed, as its preamble indicates, to provide "a common under-
standing" of the human rights and fundamental freedoms referred to
in the United Nations Charter, and to serve "as a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations .... "23
Time, however, transformed the normative status of the Universal
Declaration. Today few international lawyers would deny that the
Universal Declaration imposes some international legal obligations.
There is dispute, however, about whether all the rights it proclaims are
binding and under what circumstances, and about whether its obliga-
tory character derives from its status as an authoritative interpretation
of the human rights obligation contained in the United Nations Char-
ter, or its status as customary international law.
24
Whatever the outcome of this legal debate, it is less important than
the fact that no government today would dare to contend publicly, be
it for legal or political reasons, that it is free to violate the Universal
Declaration. The Declaration gained this special politico-legal status
in part because the effort to draft and adopt the Covenants remained
stalled in the United Nations for almost two decades, while the need
20. Id. art. 29, para. 2, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 440.5.
21. Id. art. 30, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 440.5.
22. See supra note 11.
23. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 11, reprinted in R. Lit.LICH, supra note 3, at
440.1.
24. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STAT-S § 701 reporter's notes 4-6 (Tent. Draft No. 6, vol. 1, 1985) [hereinafter RESTATE-MIENT
FOREIGN RELATIONS]; see also Sohn, supra note 1, at 16-17; Henkin, Human Righty. in 8
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1985).
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for authoritative international human rights standards became ever
more urgent. As time went on, the mere existence of the Declaration
as the only United Nations human rights instrument of general appli-
cability endowed it with greater and greater legitimacy. Whenever
governments, the United Nations, or other international organiza-
tions had to deal with human rights issues, they referred to and drew
on the standard set out in the Declaration, until it came to symbolize
"human rights" the world over. This phenomenon, in turn, gave even
greater strength to the belief, now very widely held, that all govern-
ments have an "obligation" to ensure the enjoyment of the rights the
Declaration proclaims. This belief finds expression in many interna-
tional instruments. A good example is the Helsinki Final Act, which
contains the following language: "In the field of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
2 5
In my view, the legal obligations which the Universal Declaration as
a whole creates for governments derive from the duty the United
Nations Charter imposes on them to "promote" human rights. A gov-
ernment which systematically denies the rights the Declaration pro-
claims violates this obligation. For example, South Africa's obligation
to do away with the system, of apartheid derives in part from the prin-
ciple of nondiscrimination enshrined in the United Nations Charter,
read together with the Universal Declaration, which, according to
United Nations legal practice, provides the most authoritative defini-
tion of the human rights and fundamental freedoms to which the
Charter refers.26 This view is not in conflict with the proposition that
various specific rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration have in
the meantime also acquired the status of customary international law
and thus impose additional legal obligations.2 7
B. The Covenants
The International Covenants on Human Rights consist of three sep-
arate treaties-the International Covenant on Civil and Political
25. HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 167 (T.
Buergenthal ed. 1977).
26. Henkin, The International Bill ofRights: The Universal Declaration and the Covenants, in
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 6 (R. Bernhardt & J. Jolowicz ed. 1987)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT].
27. RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 24, § 702.
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Rights, 28 the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,2 9 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.3" These treaties were adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1966. Another decade passed
before thirty-five states-the number required to bring the two Cove-
nants into force-ratified them. Two more years elapsed before the
Optional Protocol entered into force; it took that long to get ten states
to subject themselves to the very weak individual petition system that
is provided for by the Protocol.
The Covenants were designed to transform the general principles
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration into binding treaty obliga-
tions. This meant that the lofty rhetoric of the Declaration had to give
way to precise statutory language, and that exceptions, limitations,
and restrictions on the exercise of various rights had to be spelled out
in considerable detail. The Covenants also sought to establish an
international machinery to ensure governmental compliance.
Given the great reluctance of many governments to assume unam-
biguous international obligations to safeguard human rights, and to
accept effective international supervision, it is not surprising that the
drafting of the Covenants remained mired in legalistic squabbles and
parliamentary maneuvers for many years. The fact that the Covenants
were ultimately adopted and are in force today is, therefore, a signifi-
cant accomplishment. A strong system of international controls had
to be sacrificed to achieve adoption, however. This is a perennial
problem in the international human rights field.
The Covenants have a number of common substantive provisions.
Two of these deal with what might be described as "group" or "collec-
tive" rights. Article 1, paragraph 1 of both Covenants proclaims that
"all peoples have the right of self-determination."'" Article 1, para-
graph 2 of both instruments also recognizes that "[a]ll peoples" have
the right to freely dispose of their natural resources and that "[i]n no
28. G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter CIVIL AND POLITICAL COVENANT], reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 170.1.
29. G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter OPTIONAL PROTOCOL], reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 370.1.
30. G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC, SOCIAL ANI) CULTURAL COVENANT], reprinted in R. LILLICH. supra
note 3, at 180.1.
31. CivIL AND POLITICAl COVENANT, supra note 28, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3.
at 170.1: ECONOMIC, SOCIAl AND CULTURAL COVENANT, supra note 30, reprinted in R.
LILIIICH, supra note 3, at 180.1.
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case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence."32
Both Covenants also bar discrimination based on race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, or birth.
The catalog of civil and political rights spelled out in the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights is formulated with greater juridical preci-
sion and is somewhat longer than the list of comparable rights pro-
claimed in the Universal Declaration.33 An important addition is the
provision which bars states from denying members of ethnic, religious,
or linguistic minorities the right, "in community with other members
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their
own religion, or to use their own language."34 Some rights that the
Universal Declaration proclaims are not guaranteed by the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. Among these is the right to own prop-
erty. This right was not included in the Covenant because the differ-
ent ideological blocs represented in the United Nations were unable to
agree on its scope and definition.
The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains a
longer and more comprehensive list of economic, social, and cultural
rights than does the Universal Declaration.35 This Covenant recog-
nizes the right to work; the right to enjoy just and favorable conditions
of work and to form and join trade unions; the right to social security,
the protection of the family, and an adequate standard of living; the
right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health; and the right to education and to take part in cultural life.
The decision to have two separate treaties, one for civil and political
rights and another for economic, social, and cultural rights, was dic-
tated in part by the consideration that these two broad categories of
rights require very different methods of implementation. In general,
all a government has to do to respect civil and political rights is to
adopt and enforce appropriate laws on the subject. This approach will
in most cases not work with regard to economic, social, and cultural
32. CIVIL AND POLITICAL COVENANT, supra note 28, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3,
at 170.1; ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL COVENANT, supra note 30, reprinted in R.
LILLICH, supra note 3, at 180.1.
33. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (L. Henkin ed. 1981) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF HUMAN RIGHTS]; Lillich, Civil Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 115.
34. CIVIL AND POLITICAL COVENANT, supra note 28, art. 27, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra
note 3, at 170.8.
35. For an overview, see Alston & Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations
Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156
(1987).
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rights. Their implementation usually necessitates economic and tech-
nical resources, training, and time. Consequently, most governments
cannot assume the same legal obligations for both categories of rights.
A State Party to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is under
an immediate legal obligation to comply with its provisions. This is
not the case under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. The latter Covenant requires progressive, as distinguished
from immediate, implementation, and merely obligates each State
Party "to take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, includ-
ing particularly the adoption of legislative measures." 6 Had this
"progressive" or "promotional" approach not been adopted, few gov-
ernments, if any, could in good faith have agreed to be bound by this
Covenant.
Each Covenant has its own international machinery to encourage
and to supervise compliance by the parties to these treaties. The Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides for a reporting
system that requires the Member States to file periodic reports con-
cerning the measures they have adopted and the progress they have
made in achieving the observance of the rights the Covenant guaran-
tees. These reports are submitted to the United Nations Economic
and Social Council, which recently established a special committee of
experts, elected in their personal capacities, to review them.
The Measures of Implementation of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights consist of a reporting system and a complaint proce-
dure. The reporting system resembles that of the Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights and provides that the reports be
submitted to a body known as the Human Rights Committee, which
consists of eighteen experts elected in their individual capacities. The
States Parties are required to report to the Committee "on the meas-
ures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized" in
the Covenant.3" The Committee studies this information and reports
its findings and conclusions to the States Parties as well as to the Eco-
nomic and Social Council and the United Nations General
Assembly.3 8
36. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL COVENANT, supra note 30, art. 2, para. 1, reprinted
in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 180.1.
37. CIVIL AND POLITICAL COVENANT, supra note 28, art. 40, para. 1, reprinted in R.
LILLICH, supra note 3, at 170.11.
38. T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF
INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESSES 123 (1986).
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In addition to the reporting system, the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights establishes a procedure enabling States Parties to file
charges against other States Parties; however, this procedure is
optional. This means that it may only be invoked by and against states
whose governments, by means of a special declaration, have author-
ized the Human Rights Committee to deal with complaints. The pro-
cedure establishes a mediation and conciliation process, but no binding
adjudication or arbitration is provided. The Optional Protocol to the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establishes a similar, albeit
even weaker, complaint mechanism for dealing with complaints by
individuals charging States Parties to the Protocol with violations of
the Covenant.39
Here you can see how reluctant many states are to accept interna-
tional supervision and to empower international institutions to deter-
mine whether they are complying with their human rights obligations.
What they fear most are adverse findings by impartial international
bodies--courts, commissions, quasi-judicial tribunals-whose legiti-
macy they cannot readily impugn. Even when such bodies lack the
power to enforce their decisions, which is usually the case, they are
still a threat because governments fear adverse publicity from reputa-
ble international bodies. That is why the international supervisory
machinery of the Covenants is so weak; that is also why it is so impor-
tant to continue pushing for impartial international human rights
institutions with judicial and quasi-judicial powers.
IV. OTHER UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES
The instruments I have described for you up to now-the Universal
Declaration and the International Covenants on Human Rights-are
collectively known as the International Bill of Human Rights. Within
the United Nations system, there are a large number of other human
rights treaties that supplement the International Bill of Human
Rights. These instruments deal with specific subjects, including geno-
cide, slavery, racial discrimination, torture, women's rights, and so on.
Various United Nations human rights treaties, among them the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
and the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
39. Mose & Opsahl, The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 271 (1981); Robertson, The Implementation System:
International Measures, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 33, at
332, 351.
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Racial Discrimination, have been ratified by much larger numbers of
states than the Covenants and some have somewhat more effective
methods of international supervision.4"
V. ASSESSING THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS EFFORTS
In assessing the human rights efforts of the United Nations over the
past four decades, one is struck by the fact that as far as lawmaking is
concerned, the United Nations has revolutionized the international
law on the subject.4 Human rights have become a subject of interna-
tional concern; the body of international law applicable to human
rights is unmatched in sheer volume by any other branch of interna-
tional law.
The real problem, of course, is that much of that law is being vio-
lated daily, often on a massive scale, in many parts of the world. It
has always been easier, and it will always be easier, to promulgate
human rights law than to obtain compliance with it. This is as true on
the national plane as on the international.42 Even here in the United
States, where our Constitution and our Declaration of Independence
proclaim the principle of equality and many other rights, the task of
transforming rhetoric into reality has proved difficult and is still far
from accomplished.
Nevertheless, the existence of international human rights law has
had an important socializing impact on the international community.
Governments have gradually learned that there is a political price to
be paid for engaging in large-scale violations of human rights. That
awareness cannot but affect their conduct, either because they need
economic and military aid, or because their domestic power base may
be weakened by international condemnation. The International Bill of
Rights and the many other human rights treaties-whose existence is
much better known around the world than in the United States-legit-
imate the struggle of the victims of oppression, and give them faith
that their struggle is just, and that the law is on their side. This is true
in the Soviet Union, in Chile, in South Africa, in all parts of the world
where people are suffering large-scale violations of human rights.
40. For a useful overview, see UNITIE) NATIONs ACTION IN ri-1 FIEI ) OF HUMAN RIGHrs.
U.N. Doc. ST/HR/2/Rev.I. U.N. Sales No. E.83.XIV.2 (1983).
41. Professor Sohn characterizes what has taken place as a "'silent revolution." Sohn. supra
note 1, at 1.
42. Buergenthal, The Demand for Freedom: Remarks. 75 11ROc. Am. SocNY INT'i L. 94
(1981).
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When law, whether domestic or international, mirrors the aspira-
tions of society and captures its imagination, it acquires a moral and
political force whose impact can rarely be predicted and often far
exceeds the wildest expectations of its particular lawmaker. Those
who believe that Realpolitik means only military and political power
have not learned the lesson of history about the' force of ideas and the
irony of hypocrisy. Many of the countries which have voted in the
United Nations for human rights instruments without any intention of
complying with them gradually find that these instruments impose
restraints on them and limit their freedom of action. The cynics tend
to miss this point.
VI. REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
The United Nations' normative activities remain a first step in the
uphill struggle to reduce human rights violations in the world. These
activities have also played an important role in encouraging the estab-
lishment of regional human rights systems. Three such systems are in
existence today, one in Europe, one in the Americas, and the third,
which came into being only a few months ago, in Africa.
The European system is the oldest of the three and is generally con-
sidered to be the most effective.43 It was created in the 1950's, when a
group of democratic nations in Europe decided that it would take the
United Nations too long to establish an effective international system
for the protection of human rights. Not wanting to wait, they con-
cluded the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms.' This treaty was adopted within the
framework of the Council of Europe, which is an organization of
twenty-one Western European nations.
The European Convention guarantees basic civil and political
rights. On the international plane, these rights are enforced by means
of individual petitions and interstate complaints filed with the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights, followed by appeals to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights
currently hears between thirty and forty cases annually. The number
of complaints dealt with by the European Commission, whose task it
is to screen them, is substantially larger. The decisions of the Euro-
pean Court are routinely complied with by European governments.
43. Higgins, The European Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9,
at 495; Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 26, at 31.
44. Signed Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 3, at 500.1.
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As a matter of fact, the system has been so effective in the last decade
that the Court has for all practical purposes become Western
Europe's constitutional court. Its case law and practice resembles
that of the United States Supreme Court.45 It is obvious, of course,
that the success and effectiveness of this system can be attributed to
the democratic climate and economic health of Western Europe.
The inter-American system for the protection of human rights func-
tions within the institutional framework of the Organization of Ameri-
can States ("OAS").46 The OAS is a regional intergovernmental
organization that includes thirty-one Latin American and English-
speaking nations of the Americas, including the United States, but not
Canada. The human rights instruments applicable in the inter-Ameri-
can system are the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man and the American Convention of Human Rights.
Although the American Declaration, not unlike the Universal Dec-
laration, was not deemed to be legally binding at the time it was pro-
claimed in 1948, it has now been accepted as a normative instrument
of the inter-American system that contains the authoritative catalog of
the human rights which all States Parties to the OAS Charter are
required to promote. The Declaration enumerates civil and political
rights as well as some economic, social, and cultural rights. The
American Convention on Human Rights is a treaty, concluded under
the auspices of the OAS, that guarantees basic civil and political rights
only. It entered into force in 1978 and has to date been ratified by
twenty out of thirty-one OAS member states, including all but three-
Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay-of its Latin American members; Brazil
appears to be close to ratification. By contrast, the United States and
all but three of the Commonwealth Caribbean nations-Barbados,
Grenada, and Jamaica-have not adhered to the Convention.
The institutional structure established by the American Convention
is modeled on that of the European Convention.17 The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court have
functions similar to those of their European counterparts. The Inter-
45. See Frowein, Recent Developments Concerning the European Convention on Human
Rights, in LAWS, RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 11. 27 (J.
Sundberg ed. 1986).
46. See Buergenthal, Implementation in the Inter-American Htman Rights System. in
INTLRNATIONAl ENFORCF.M:INT. supra note 26, at 57; T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D.
Slt2 I ION, PROITECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE1 AMIERICAS: SEII.CTED PROBLEMS (2d ed.
1986).
47. BuergenthaI, The American and European Conventions on Human Rights: Similarities and
Difference5. 30 AM. U.L. RI-v. 155 (1980); Frowein, The European and the American
Conventions on Human Rights-A Comnparion. I HUM. RiS L.J. 44 (1980).
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American Commission has additional powers that derive from its sta-
tus as an OAS Charter organ. The Court also has very extensive advi-
sory jurisdiction, which is substantially broader than that conferred
on the European Court.48 Since the human rights problems facing the
Americas tend to be much more serious than those of Western
Europe, the Inter-American Commission and Court cannot point to
the significant successes that have been made in Europe. This is not to
say that the inter-American system has made no important contribu-
tions to the improvement of the human rights conditions in the Ameri-
cas. It has and continues to do so, but the task is much more difficult
because the problems of the region, particularly in Latin America, are
so very difficult.
The newest of the three existing regional human rights systems is
that established by the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights.49 This Charter is a treaty adopted in 1981 under the auspices
of the Organization of African Unity and which entered into force on
October 21, 1986. It differs from the European and American Con-
ventions in a number of important respects. The African Charter pro-
claims civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural
rights. It deals not only with individual but also with peoples'
rights,5" and it proclaims duties of the individual as well as rights. The
rights guaranteed in the African Charter are drafted with less juridical
precision and permit more restrictions than the two other regional
instruments. The Charter establishes an African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights, but it does not provide for a court. In
general, the enforcement machinery or so-called "measures of imple-
mentation" of the African Charter resemble those of the United
Nations Covenants more than the other two regional instruments.
Some language of the African Charter is broad enough, however, to
permit the African Commission, if it is so inclined and the political
climate is ripe for it, to be quite creative and to develop more effective
enforcement techniques than would be possible under the Covenants.
VII. CONCLUSION
I have given you a very cursory overview of existing international
human law and institutions. I have not mentioned the important work
48. Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1985).
49. Gittleman, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22 VA.
J. INT'L L. 667 (1982).
50. Marie, Relations Between Peoples' Rights and Human Rights: Semantic and
Methodological Distinctions, 7 HuM. RTs. L.J. 195 (1986).
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of the International Labor Organization in this field, nor have I spo-
ken about UNESCO. The activities of the International Committee
of the Red Cross in the development of humanitarian law, a fascinat-
ing area, have not been considered, nor have I dealt with the impor-
tant work being done by nongovernmental international human rights
organizations such as Amnesty International. In short, I have
presented more than the tip of the iceberg, but less than the whole, for
there is much activity in this field.
Much more remains to be done, of course. What are the prospects
for the future? In an American law school setting, it is particularly
important to point out that law and courts cannot solve all societal ills
and problems. We forget that quite often. Because of our history and
the achievements of law and courts in our society, we tend to believe in
the omnipotence of law and ascribe powers to it that it does not have,
particularly in other societies. Many human rights violations being
committed around the world are closely tied to longstanding political,
economic, and social ills that cannot be cured overnight by legislation
and judicial institutions, however progressive, imaginative, or well-
meaning. Prejudice, ignorance, hunger, disease, greed, and political
corruption are at the heart of so many violations of human rights in
the world we live in. They take time, political vision, education, eco-
nomic and technical resources to combat. It is sad, but true, that man-
kind's universal yearning for human rights tends to be egocentric: we
believe that we are entitled to the enjoyment of human rights, but we
do not necessarily always believe that others are also entitled to the
same rights.
Of course, law and legal institutions, particularly if they enjoy polit-
ical legitimacy, do have a significant impact on the behavior of people
and governments. That is why the lawmaking process in the interna-
tional human rights field is so important and needs to be encouraged.
It gives legitimacy to the struggle for human rights in many parts of
the world; it serves, more often than we probably know, to restrain
repressive governmental behavior, and it provides the international
community with internationally accepted standards by which to judge
and condemn violations of human rights. In the long run, this con-
tributes to a world climate which is less and less tolerant of govern-
ments that violate human rights, which in turn helps to reduce such
violations.
Those of us who work in the human rights field are often close to
despairing, for there is still so much cruelty and inhumanity all around
us. But there are occasions for rejoicing: the fall of the Marcos and
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Duvalier regimes, the demise in the past years of many military
regimes in Latin America, the large-scale release of dissidents in the
Soviet Union. These and similar developments give others in the
world hope for a better tomorrow. It is that hope that must be kept
alive and reinforced by those of us who are fortunate enough to live in
free societies. Without that effort, the fulfillment of mankind's yearn-
ing for human rights will become an empty dream.
